: The average proportion of j-agents in all collaborators of the i-agent q ij versus the ratio w j of j-agents in the whole collaboration network for N s (I c , t) . The dates are t = 1, 60, and 145 and the intimacy thresholds are I c = 0, 10, 100, 200, 500, and 1000 from left to right. In each plot, j = 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the three types of agents (warriors, priests, mages). Figure S3: Preference measure from i-agents to j-agents P ij (t) versus the ratio of j-agents in the whole collaboration network w j for N s (I c , t). The dates are t = 1, 60, and 145 and the intimacy thresholds are I c = 0, 10, 100, 200, 500, and 1000 from left to right. In each plot, j = 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the three types of agents (warriors, priests, mages). Figure S4 : Evolution of the preference measure P ij (I c , t) from i-agents to j-agents. The intimacy thresholds are I c = 0, 1, 10, 500, 1000 and 2000 from top to bottom. In each plot, j = 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the three types of agents (warriors, priests, mages). Figure S5 : Evolution of the estimated preference coefficient γ ij (I c , t) from i-agents to j-agents for different thresholds I c . Each row corresponds to an intimacy threshold I c with I c = 0, 1, 10, 500, 1000, and 2000 from top to bottom. In each plot, j = 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the three types of agents (warriors, priests, mages). The γ ii (I c , t) coefficients are basically less than 1 with very few exceptions, indicating that the agents do not prefer to collaborate with same-profession agents and are thus heterophilious. The γ ij (I c , t) coefficients with i ̸ = j are basically greater than 1 with very few exceptions, indicating that the agents prefer to collaborate with different-profession agents. Warriors show comparative preference to priests and mages when I c is small and prefer to collabotate with priests than mages when I c is large. Mages prefer more to priests when I c is small and prefer more to warriors when I c is large. Figure S6 : Evolution of the estimated preference coefficient γ ij (I c , t) from i-agents to j-agents for different thresholds I c . Each row corresponds to an intimacy threshold I c with I c = 0, 1, 10, 500, 1000, and 2000 from top to bottom. In each plot, j = 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the three types of agents (warriors, priests, mages). Figure S8 : Relationship between the relative preference lg (P 2k−1 /P 2k ) and relative economic output lg (Y 2k−1 /Y 2k ) for different I c and t. For each I c and t, the relative economic yield lg(Y 2k−1 /Y 2k ) and the relative preference lg(P 2k−1 /P 2k ) are calculated for each society, which is presented as a point in the corresponding plot. The four colors stands for four significance levels (p-values) of the correlation: p < 0.001 for red plots, 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 for yellow plots, and 0.01 ≤ p for green plots. Figure S9 : Relationship between the relative complementarity lg (C 2k−1 /C 2k ) and the relative economic output lg (Y 2k−1 /Y 2k ) for different I c and t. For each I c and t, the relative economic yield lg(Y 2k−1 /Y 2k ) and the relative complementarity lg(C 2k−1 /C 2k ) are calculated for each society, which is presented as a point in the corresponding plot. The four colors stands for four significance levels (p-values) of the correlation: p < 0.001 for red plots, 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 for yellow plots, and 0.01 ≤ p for green plots.
